

THE ARTES  
OF LOGIKE AND

Rethorike, plainlie set forth in the  
Englishe tongue, easie to be leashed and practised  
together with examples for the practise of  
the same, for Methode in the government  
of the familie prescribed in the word of God:

And for the whole in the resolution or  
opening of certaine partes of  
Scripture, according to  
*the same*

Bought of William  
Singleton his book  
price viij<sup>d</sup>



*the gift of*  
*William Singleton*

*to the use of*  
*the school*

*of the town*  
*of*

1584

1584

*Christopher Wright*  
*Robertus Hillary*  
*Robertus Hillary*

OF LOCKE AND THE ARTS

Retrospective plainlie for found in the  
English tongue calls to be learned and practise  
together with examples for the practise of  
the same for Manners in the government  
of the familie prescribed in the word of God:  
And for the whole in the relation of  
opening of curious parts of  
Learning according to  
the same



1284

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# TO THE CHRLE READER.

them for the *Romans* and *Gracians* alone, or for the expert in these tounge their  
tree denizons: but at the least that by their trafficke, it might with their gain  
of the praise and glory, become common to every particular nation, that eu-  
rie one who had needs, might bue of the same. Wherefore seeing the end, as  
with their gaine the commoditie of all, let them not still keepe in this corner  
to make rare & excessively deere, least the people *desire* them: especially now  
that the famins of prouision to discerne of so many strifes and subtilties, to  
vnderstand and iudge of so many Treatises as are written both to laurie and  
honour the worlde, both in regard of matters ciuill and diuine, humane and  
spirituall, doeth daily crye and call for it. Let them take heede also of open  
iniustice, for seeing the rotation vfe and practise of al men in generall: both  
in reasoning to the purpose, and in speaking with some grace and elegancie  
hath sowne the seede of these artes, why should not all reape where all haue  
sowne? At least, why should not some of euery sort glean, though by theie  
cunning they had purchased these arts, as corne fieldes proper to themselves?  
Vnder the more excellent and necessarie theie commodities be (as cousteous  
men) they wil be the more vnmerciful and nigardly. Neither let them ob-  
stinate *be* in a fowle hand: for besides that weapons are not restrained: &  
eyed onely to masters of fence, not linging to musicians onely: the simple plain-  
nesse of these treatises, which drawe me to no curious or doubtful discourses,  
but onely purchase in minde of that which they may easily seeke and know  
in most familiar examples with great fruite and delight, shal sufficiently an-  
swere for themselves in this behalte: praying al men to vfe them with some  
studie as their callings may suffer, to strengthen their iudgement, to discerne  
of the sayings and writings of other men, to keepe better that which they  
leaue, and not beyonde their gife and calling, to aduenture to a further vfe  
then they can reach vnto. And thus much for the first sort.

Concerning the seconde I wil not deale with euery alteration and diffe-  
rence, for some are suche as I thinke the very alteration considered with the  
common rules nowe receiued of the sounder sorte, to iudge by, will giue suf-  
ficient defence: the other more doubtfull and straunge, I will as briefly and  
plainely as I can maintaine. VVherin if I goe beyond the capacite or reach of  
the vnlearned, they are to be desired either to stay till they haue somewhat la-  
boured in these artes, or els not to trouble these ues at all with this discourse,  
but leaue it to those for whose satisfaction chiefly it is written. And here our  
labour shal be for the Logike: for the other I suppose need not this defence, as  
hauing few and light alterations. Concerning the definition of Logike I wil  
not struge whether well reasoning, which is reasoning according to the arte,  
be contained in the general of the definition, *An ut ar, it is* sufficient for me  
that in my definition there is a true general, an art, and a true full difference  
by which it differeth from all other arts: namely that it is of reasoning.  
Now whether the proper end bee declared by the addition of well, or no, I  
leauie it to those who wil dispute of al the causes and not of the definition of  
Logike. For there is no reason why the ende of any thing shoulde come into  
the definition any more then the efficient cause: when as the difference is be-  
fore full and sufficient. In inuention that is most general, which concerneth  
the distribution of an argument, that I make it not *Artificial* and *inartificial*,  
but *Natural*, and arising of the *first*, and after deuide the latter into more *Artificial*  
and



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and less artificial. At which none neede greatly to marvel seeing that reason which by arte appeareth the greater force of an other reason to the weak or force it hath in it selfe, and so reasoneth more forcibly, as doeth a testimonie, whose force the laide dependeth vpon other argumentes, it must be both artificiall, and arise in parte of another; but because it hath neither his force in it selfe, nor arise perfectly as a definition or deuision, but in parte onely from other argumentes: It may for both causes be wel iudged to be an Argument, arising perfectly of the first, and so be called a lesse artificiall arising of the first. The general beyng touched, the difference in the causes, aske the next place, where the referring of the end vnto the efficient cause, will be odious; but if it be weighed that by this meanes, the truth is preferred & the doctrine of the end which is not commonly discerned from the effect and adioynt, is more cleared, the gayne wil easily recompense the alteration of the place. For seeing it is a cause onely as it bringeth some force to the very beyng of the thing, and al the force it bringeth is to moue the efficient or making cause to worke, it followeth that in that respect onely it is a cause; as if be sayd, the end doeth not moue every efficient as the end of naturall and artificiall thinges, as of theire rotes, the plumer in a clock to force the next causes of the orderly motions: the answer is, they are deceyued, for as it regardeth these artificiall thinges, it is an effect of the doing of it, and an adioynt in regarde of the force where with it is done: and to these things it giueth or bringeth nothing, but receyueh and taketh al from them; but it is a cause onely as it was set before the Author of nature, or the artificer to moue him to make this thing apt to this effect, or to haue these properties: so that my sentence remaineth necessarily true. Neither doe I see what other respect of a cause it can haue, for that which some speak of the perfection it bringeth to the thing, is altogether vntrue, for all the perfection of the thing cometh from the efficient, and lyeth in the matter and forme as the causes of the thing and the adioynts, as the ornaments of it: In which respect this perfection is caused, and doeth not cause. The next to this is that the diuision of *concerning* and *begetting* cause is leste out, and iustly. For when as there ought to be no diuision, but that which ariseth of some difference of the partes betweene themselves, and of agreement with the whole, there beyng here no difference in the partes, because the *begetting* cause is referred to *procreation*, as to his next effect: and the *concerning* or *preserving* cause, as to the next effect to *preservation*: In which respectes they remaine onely simple as all others *efficient* or *making* causes: it is to be inferred that they can make no distribution of the efficient cause.

The like is to be said, of working by it selfe and by chaunce, which make no difference of working or causing: for although in such the principall instrument had no such end or purpose, yet the chiefe worker G O D in his providence hath besides this putteth no difference in that force which bringeth forth effect, but only betwene the purpose, of the chiefe worker of the action, god: who *worketh all things according to the counsel of his owne wil*, and the principall instrument who did it to another purpose. Next to these follow the difference in the disagreeing argumentes, where this is one and the chiefe; that the diuisions of: *Contraries* are leste out: First into *affirming* and *denying*, which are no sortes of contraries, but of the manner of vtying contraries, which as it falleth not into Logike to handle, so it is nothing to this purpose, because the difference

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rence ariseth not from any distinction of the contrariety it selfe, which it shoulde doe, if they were diuers sorts of contraries, but from the difference of expressing one and the same kind. And this is yet more cleare in the diuers forces of these: for relatives are no contraries, because the contrarietie lyeth in the denial of the relation, not in the relation: neither can it in that respect be a newe sorte of contrarietie, for when all the repugnancie lyeth in these two regards, the one that being set as agreeing in the consideration of reasons to one, it must be disagreeing & opposite in the same consideration one to another, as if it agree with *Isack* to be *Isacks* father, it must disagree with *Isack* to be so, this it hath from the general nature of opposites, the other respect being that one is set against one, that it hath from the general rule of contrarietie, and further it repugneth not. If saye one it hath this proper that relatives are here contrary, the answer is that bringeth no new kind of contrariety, and if this be a iust cause of a diuision of contraries, you may diuide contraries againe: some of causes, some of effects, some of subjects, and some of adioints: seeing it may be said, these are causes which are contrary, as it is sayde, these are relatives which are contrary.

The like almost may be sayde of the *primatives*, which are contraries, whereof one is naturally in the *subiect* as the *habitus*, and the other drieth out or drieth in of the *habitus*: for what new sorte of contrariety is here? Surely no other but that one is set against one, for the being naturally or not naturally in the *subiect*, belongeth not to the Logician to consider, but the *seueral* Maister in his art, as to the *Physition* that health is naturally in the body and how, that sickness drieth that away, and how: otherwise, why may we not make hurtful contraries, whereof one is hurtful to the *subiect*, or profitable contraries, whereof one is profitable to the *subiect*, as *peace* and *warre* to a *common wealth*, *vice* and *vertue* to the *minde*?

Now letvs consider of those others which they call *contradictories*, when one affirmeth, and the other denieth, as a man, not a man: iust, not iust. Concerning these, when al the contrarietie (which they saye) is proper to them, lyeth eyther in the *contradiction*, it is, it is not: which is proper to iudgement, not to inuention, to sette forth, or that one thinge is opposed to all other things which it is not: which is no contrariety, but the opposition of disparates, seeing one is not opposed to one kinde but one to many kindes, and that equally, as a man opposed to not a man, is equally opposed to spirits, to fowles, fishes, beastes, vn sensible creatures, &c. in the same not a man, wherefore it followeth, that eyther they must allowe my dooing, or else in the first bring in confusion why last they speake of that parte in one parte of the arte, which is proper to the other, and in the second confusion and folly both: whilst they make that a contrary which is none, and without al gaine repeat that which they haue sufficiently handled before.

Neither let any say they are contrarie, because there is no middle between man and not a man, for so there is not between man and other things, & yet they are not contrary but disparates only.

And thus much for the first arguments.

The leaving out of *Notation* and *Coniugation* remayneth onely to bee spoken of in Inuention, the reason whereof is manifest, because it is graunted of al that they haue no new force, besides the first, no newe reason or argument arising from

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from the first: For he is *in* it, he doth *in* it, these are coniugetes, referre the one vnto another, and what is their besides the cause and the effect? What force or reason more? For that *in* and *in* are formed one of an other, appertaineth to Grammar, that they allude fitly to the figure of Rethorike, called *Polyptoton*, which chaungeth finely the end or case of words.

The like is to be saide of *Notation*, which is the interpretation of a name, which appertaineth not to Logike but to Dictionaries: as in this: An argument is so called, because it argueth, a faithfull man, because he hath faith: what force of reason is there in the first example? of the cause and the effect. VVhat in the other? Of the effect and the cause. But is there nothing els? yes, A fitte and elegant vttering of diuers things by words, not much, but somewhat differing in sound, as *argument*, *arguing*, *sayth*, *saythfull*: but this is neyther reason, nor new force of reason, but only an elegacie of the Trope called *Panematisis*, or chaunge of the name. VVherefore let vs keepe them no longer, nowe the owner claymeth them, but according to the law turne them home againe. Thus much for inuention: As for the chaunge in a testimonie, I am content to leaue it vnto the iudgment of the reader, when hee shall examine it according to the rules of Logike: as also those small differences which are in the seconde parte of Logike, for in that sometimes the firste sorte of a Syllogisme is founde in all his partes, there is nowe no longer any reason to trafe him vppe onely in an *Enthymema*. And thus muche for the satisfying of both these sortes. Nowe, if they be not fully contented, my desire is of the former to beare with that, for the commoditie of others, which themselves like not. The other sort also I pray, to satisfie themselves in mending and bettering that which cannot yet sufficiently please them. And so I commit thee to the direction of God his Spirite, whom I pray so to increase thy knowledge by all good and lawfull meanes, as thou mayest discerne thinges that differ, and walke without offence, vntill the day of the Lords.

AMEN.



*The first Chapter.*

*Of the definition and Division of Logike, and of*

**LOGIKE** is an Art of reasoning.

Logike hath 2. parts, 1. The spring of reasons called Invention.

The spring of reason is the first part of Logike, which giueth rules of the forme of reasons, which because it doth helpe muche to the finding out of reasons, is commonly called Inuention.

A reason is that, which is apt to reason withall, which is commonly called an Argument: of which force are all things, when they are referred in consideration of reason one vnto another. For there is such an agreement of the diuersities of reasons, as the nature of one hangeth vpon another, so that he that perfectly knoweth one, may also know the other, as in this example: *God is the Sauer of all men: where God being referred to saluation, is a medium for first; saluation by the fault, and saluation being referred to God, setteth him forth by a thing caused, commonly called the effect: in which also we see, he that knoweth God to be the cause of saluation, knoweth also saluation to be the thing caused of God.*

Arguments are many times knowingly about propriety and much can be said after ap-

...which are the first of the first...

Of reasons there are two forties, } Those which are of the first, } and draw a hundred to it  
The first, are those which have beginning in them selves, as in this example: *Let  
suffereth long. Long is beautiful. Long doth not grow weary.* With these the Apostle sheweth the

excellence of Loug, by a reason of description which unites of other regions, as of that which Loug doth cause, *long suffering* : Of the contraries to Loug, as *evil, firmness, dealing, &c.*

First arguments are of 1. **Brief**, **Simple or uncompared**, **Compared**.

Simple, it's reason: which hath force in it, selfe, without regards of any manner of comparison: as, *Thy will be done, O Lord, in Heaven*: Where was fear, the doing of the will of God is fear the first by reason which is untimpaired: namely by those which should do it, *Men in earth*: then by a comparison of the like, as the angels in Heaven do it.

Uncompared arguments: { Agreeable  
{ Disagreeable.

Agreeable





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**They are two** The matter and the forme.

The matter is a cause of the which the thing caused is made. So the Torde made woman of the rib of man. Noah the Arke of gine trees.

The forme is a cause by the which a thing is that which it is: and so differeth from all other things: as in the example of man before mentioned. For the naturall forme of things, though they may be conceived by reason, yet they cannot well be uttered by speech.

The artificiall forme of things is in which more easie to be conceived in reason, and uttered in words: and therefore of such type are there many, as in all writers, so in the Scriptures especially: So GOD made woman of the rib of the Arke and of the Arke of egypt, the Table, the Chandel, the Table of shewbread, the mercie Seate, the Alter of burnt offerings, the Cause of the Tabernacle, and all the furniture and appurtenances thereunto: by which artificiall forme they be that they be, and differ from all other things.

Thus much of the cause: Now followeth the thing caused.

The thing caused, is that which is by the whole force of all the causes, As, So GOD loved the world, as he gave his only begotten sonne, that whosoever believeth in him, should not perish, but have eternal life. Where our happiness is the thing caused: the loue of GOD, and faith the efficient cause. Christ the materiall cause, and eternal life the formall cause. So also every worke or moving of any thing, is the effect or thing caused by the worker or mover. Hitherto of more agreeable reasons. Of both which relatives are most excellent example, they are those which are so of and by one another, that they are the mutuall causes and effectes one of another. As, The Father and the Sonne, the end and means, the reach and the way.

Now of these less agreeable arguments, I will give some reasons are such in whose agreement selfe is given and received to and from one another: as appeareth in the example of more agreeable reasons.

The subject is of which receiveth the action.

Two forms. That wherein the action is occupied. As in this example. Wherefore is the carke of the ship in the Eagle's nest. Where we see in the first part, the worde where no more is a place, which is the subject of the thing that is in it, is the subject which receiveth the action. In the second part, wherein the Eagles which are the actions, occupy themselves by residing. So the ship is the subject, of an habitation: and the Church is the subject of the ship, because in these things they are occupied.

The subject which receiveth. That which receiveth the action. So Job was the subject in which was founde the wickednesse, and the feare of GOD: and the minde is the subject in which are all qualities. So Job and other men were made the subjects, which receive the action, when they were made to sleep.

An adiointe is that which is adioyned unto anything, as in all the former examples, the things referred vnto their subjects were the adiointes: so whatsoever is referred vnto any thing not being cause or effect of the same, it is the adiointe.

Againe, adiointes are either Common, or Exter, of whom separable or inseparable. Common, or Exter, of whom separable or inseparable, which for the most parte arise of the causes or being of the things, and are therefore called essentiall or of the being.

Common are those which are ioyned vnto diuers subiectes, as the power of eating, drinking, sleeping, &c. are common adioints to men and beastes, and can not be separated. So riches, pouertie, sicknesse, and health, are common adioints to good and euill men, and may be separated from them.

A proper adiointe is that which is alwaies ioined to one and the same subiect. So righteoulnesse, faith, joy in the holy Ghost, are the proper adioints to the children of God: to be seen and felt, are the proper adioints of a bodie, and these are inseparable. And it was proper to Adam and Ehuah, to enjoy Paradise, and yet separable. Also Paule: o herapt y<sup>e</sup> into the thirde heauen, and yet separable.

Hitherto of an agreeable argument, whereby onely those things that differ in them selues may yet be saide to be one. So Christe sayeth: *I and my Father are one*: meaninge in nature, or cause. So Iohn sayeth: *There are three which haue witness in heauen, the Father, the Word, and the Spirit, and these three are one*, meaning in their witness, which is their effecte. So paule saith: *Hee that planteth and hee that watereth, are one*: that is in office and function, which is the adiointe.

## The thirde Chapter.

### Of disagreeable arguments.

**D**isagreeable reasons are those reasons which disagree being referred one vnto another.

Disagreeable reasons are of two sortes: **D**iuers, or somewhat differing. Such as can not stande together, commonly called Opposites.

Diuers reasons are those which disagree onely in respect or after a certaine maner, the notes whereof are commonly these: Not this, but that: albeit, neuerthelesse, notwithstanding, and such like. As, *I know thy worker, thy labour, thy patience, neuerthelesse I haue somewhat against thee, because thou hast left thy first loue*. VWhere wee see, that although these were disagreeing in respect of this Church, yet they may agree: for Christs may both know their patience and workes, and yet haue nothing against them. And these reasons, and all such answering the one to the other, which haue notes, are sometimes set downe fully by thre parties, answering one vnto another, sometimes by their notes onely.

Reasons which cannot stande together, are reasons which differ not onely in respect, but also in nature, or the thing it selfe, and therefore can not agree with the same thing, at the same time, according to the same respect or consideration. So one can not be sicke and well at the same time in the same part, in consideration of the soule or body, but he may be sicke to day, and whole to morrowe, ill in his hand, and well in his hand, well in respect of his body, and ill in respect of his soule.

Opposites are eyther **S**undrie, commonly called disperates, or contrarie.

Sundrie or disperates are opposites, whereof one is equally set against manie. Dauid Psalm 8, theveth, that God hath giuen dominion vnto man, ouer sheepe, oxen

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beastes of the field, fowles of the ayre, fishes of the sea, all which creatures are equally set one against another.

Contraries are opposites whereof one is set against one. And therefore they directly right one against another: So Christ and Beliall, light and darkenesse, Christs and Antichriste, heauen and hell, life and death, good and euill, iust and iniust, sickes and whole, to be ones Father and his begotten Son, And hitherto of vncopared reasons.

### The fourth Chapter.

#### Of compared arguments.

**C**OMPARED reasons are such as are compared one with another, which when it hath parts, the first setteth downe the comparison called the propounding part or proposition, the other applieth the comparison to the thing compared called the applying, rendering part or addition As. Mat. 24. *As in the dayes of Noah, so shall the coming of the Sonne of man be. For as in the dayes which were before the flood, they did eate and drinke, they married and gave to marriage, euen vnto the dayes in which Noah entered into the Arke, and knew not till the flood came and took them all, so shall the coming of the sonne of man be.* In which example in the first of the verses, there are the signes of the comparisons. As, *And so,* in the two latter verses, are the two parts of the whole comparison, the first setting down the comparison which is taken from the flood of Noah, the other applying the comparison to the thing compared, that is, the coming of Christ.

Comparison is eyther in  $\begin{cases} \text{Quantitie, or} \\ \text{Qualitie.} \end{cases}$

Comparison of quantity, is when the quantitie of the thing is compared together

Quantitie is eyther  $\begin{cases} \text{Equall, or} \\ \text{vnequall.} \end{cases}$

Reasons of equall comparison, are those whose quantitie is equall.

The notes of the equall reasons are these: As. *equall, alike, the same that, so much, no greater, as in these examples: With what measure ye measure, with the same it shall be measured to you againe. So Nomb. 9. Ye shall haue the same lawe both for the stranger, and him that is borne in the land. So Ioshua 14. And yet am I so strong at this time, as I was when Moses sent me, as strong as I was then, so strong am I now, eyther for name or for gouernement. Hebr. 14. And it maketh much the more excellent than the Angelles, inasmuch as he hath obtained a more excellent nature then they.*

Vnequall are those whose quantitie is not the like.

Vnequall reasons are of two sortes  $\begin{cases} \text{Greater.} \\ \text{Lesse.} \end{cases}$

The greater is that whose quantitie is greater then that wherevnto it is compared: the notes whereof are these: *Not onely, but also: rather this then that: Also every note of a greater degree of comparison. As, Rom. 5. 3. Neither doe we suffer onely, but also we reioyce in tribulation. Likewise Psal. 88. 10. I had rather be a doore keeper in the house of the Lord, then to dwell in the tabernacle of Piness. And Proverb. 8. 11. Eye pleasedme is better then*

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*Preuious stone.* Also Psa. 19. *And more to be desired then gold, and sweeter also then the honey combe.*

Also denialles in comparison, As 1. Cor. 16. *Cerill sent me not to baptise, but to preach,* so wit, nor so much to baptise, as to preach.

The lesser are those whose quantity is lesser then that, wherevnto it is compared, the signes whereof are these, nor this only, but nor that, or no not that, or a deniall of the equall or equalitie. As, 1. Cor. 3. 2. *For you were not able to beare it, no nor are ye now able to beare it.* Also Rom. 3. 12. *There is none that doth good, no not one.* Likewise 2. Kings. 23. 25. *VVhere Iosias is denied to be equal to the Kings that were before or after him, and preferred above them all.* Hezekiah by the same argument is commended. 2. King. 16. 5. *So the serpent is commended to be the subtillest beast of all that were upon the earth.* Gen. 3. 1.

Hitherto of the comparison of quantitie.

Now followeth the comparison of qualitie;

VVhich is eyther of things } Like.  
Valike.

Like, which haue the same qualitie, the signes whereof, are, *Like as, euen as, and so also, a deniall of the like,* Mat. 13. 24. *The kingdomes of heauen unlike vnto a man that sowed good seede in his field.* Mat. 6. 5. *VVhen thou prayest be not as the hypocrites are.* Also Mat. 12. 39. *But when as in the dayes of Noah, so shall the coming of the Son of man be.* Likewise Gal. 4. 1. *Then I say, the beire as long as he is a child, differeth nothing from aservant; though he be Lord of all.*

The parts of a similitude are sometimes seuered or distinguished by three confiderations or steppes of comparison, commonly called termes; & sometimes by foure. By three, 1. Thes. 3. 2. *For ye know full well, that the Lords shall come downe as a thief in the night.* Where one steppes of comparison must be twice repeated thus: As the thief in the night cometh sodainly, so the Lords day cometh sodainly.

By foure, in the 3. verse thus: *For when the pharisee say, peace and safety, then shall come upon them sodaine destruction, as the trauel of a woman with child, wherein theyre seuered or distinct termes or steppes are plaine and manifest, to wit, the careless wicked, sudden destruction, of the woman with childe, sodayne trauell.*

Vnlike is that, whose qualitie in comparison is not the same. The signes or notes whereof are, *Vnlike, differing, otherwise.* As, Dan. 7. 7. *And it was vnlike the beasts of the fildes, that were before.* Also 1. Tim. 6. 3. *If any man teach otherwise.* Also 5. 28. and 10. 35. on 11.

Thus much of the first reasons. Now followe those that arise of the first.

## The fiftie Chapter.

**R**easons arising of the first, are those which are made by the ioyning together of the first.

They are of two } More Artificiall.  
sortes. } Lesse artificiall.

More artificiall is that which hath force of it selfe to reason withall. Rom. 4. 6. *As Dauid also describeth the blessednes of a man to whom God imputeth righteousness without works, Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven, and whose sinnes be covered.* VVhere the Apostle setteth forth righteousness by a declaration arising of two arguments, to wit, agreeing as the cause, imputation of righteousness: disagreeing, without works. VVhich reason

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son hath force in it selfe, because of the force which these two arguments giueh vn to it: but the prooffe of this declaration which is drawn from the wordes of Dauid, hath not so much authority from the thing saide, or the matter it selfe, as from the author of it Gods spirit by Dauid.

Of the more artificiall argumentes arising of the first. { Division; commonly called Distribution.

There are two sortes. { Definition.

Division is when the whole is deuided into parts.

The whole is that which containeth or hath in it the partes.

The partes is that which is contained of the whole.

A Diuision is made of arguments which are agreeable to the whole, but disagreeable amongst themselves, so that it is so much the more perfect, by how much the parts do more agree to the whole, and more disagree amongst themselves.

Diuision is made of { More agreeable, { First of the cause.

reasons which are { Lesse agreeable, { Then of the thing caused.

A Diuision made of the cause, is when the partes be cause of the whole, and the they are properly called members: for a members is that parte which lieth being to the whole, and the whole being of such members is called integrall. For a man in the scripture is oftentimes diuided into his members, the soule and the body; and the body into his members, as head, hands, feet, &c. So the whole Lawe diuided into his two members: First, which teacheth our duty towards God in the first table, & that which teacheth vs our duty towards our neighbour, in the second table. The whole Church is deuided into his members the part in heauen, and the part in earth.

Distribution of the thing caused, is where partes are caused of the whole, or are the effect of the whole, as when the whole kinde or general is deuided into his feuerall sortes, or specialls.

The whole kinde or general is a whole, which giueh or containeth the beyng or essence which is common to the feuerall sortes or specialls, as a liuing thing is general to man and beast, containing in it a bodily substance, which hath life and sense, whiche is the general being of man and beast.

A feuerall sorte or special, is a part comprehended vnder the whole kinde or general forme, from whence he taketh that being which is common to all the other parts or specialls, as in the 12. to the Rom. The Apostle deuider the ordinary offices of the Church into Prophets, that is Ministers occupied in the word, and other Ministers occupied in other buisness in the Church. The first sorte he deuiderd sayne into the Teacher who is occupied in doctrine, & the Pastor who is occupied in exhortation. The second sorte againe into Elders, which rule the Church, & Distributors, which distribute to the poore in which and such like examples, the first is called the moste general, the other the vnder general, by the term which in respect of the former, is the special, and in respect of that that followeth is the general. The last is the moste est sorte, or most special, because it cannot be deuided into more specialls, and deuision of the causes into the effects, is most excellent: yet that is not to be neglected when the partes are only set forth by their effects, as Paul on many occasions of foure small things in the earth by the effects, the Ministers prepare their meate in the Sommer, the Mife which make their dwelling in the Rocks, and the Grampoppers, which goe out in bandes.

Whertho of the distribution of more agreeable reasons,

Now

THE ARTE

Now followeth of lesse agreeable.

As of the Subject.  
Adioynt.

The Divisions of the Subject or adioynt are when the partes are set forth by the subiects or adioyntes. So Iohn 1. 5. 6. 7. 8. In his diuision of witnesses, setteth forth the partes by the Subject, some in heaven and some in earth. So Matt. The seede is deuided by the place: Some fell in stonie ground, some in thornie ground, some in the high way. So for the adioyntes. Rom. 14. 5. Christians are deuided by there adioyntes, some are strong, some weakes.

Of a Definition or setting forth of a thing.

A Definition is a reason arising of the first, which setteth downe what a thing is. It is eyther. { Perfect, or Vnperfect.

A perfecte Definition or setting forth of a thing, is that, which is made of the whole kinde or generall, and the proper difference of that severall sort which is defined, where the first part is called the general, the other the proper or special difference. So sione is defined to be the going aside from the Lawe or right rule of obedience, where the going aside is the general, & the right rule of obedience is the proper difference. So the Church is a number of men in Christ Iesus, where A number of men is the general, and in Christ Iesus, is the proper difference.

A description or an vnperfect setting forth of a thing, doth set a thing forth by any other reason. So Iob describeth Lenianhan by his partes, his adioyntes, comparisons, similitudes, effectes, &c.

Thus much of the more artificial argumentes. Now follow the lesse artificiall.

The sixte Chapter.

Of the lesse artificial argument, called a Testimonie.

A LESSE artificial reason, is a reason arising of the first, which reasoneth not so much by his owne force, as by the power of other reasons. It is called a Testimonie or witness.

A testimonie is eyther a { Lawe, or Notable sentence, such as be Parables, Riddles, Proverbes, &c. confessions, and Records, &c.

And they both are, either onely pronounced, or written also.

Both of these sortes also may be { With an othe, Without an othe.

And those are the general properties of a testimonie.

His sorts are eyther of { God, called Diuine, Man, called humane,



## OF LOGIKE.

For a Law, Rom. 7 there is a law written of God, to prooue that a woman may not forsake her husband as long as he liueth.

For a notable sentence. Luc 4. 23. there is a parable. *Phisitian heale thy selfe*, So al the prouerbes of Salomon are deuine and notable sentences.

Thus much of the spring of reasons.

Nowe followeth Iudgment.

# THE SECONDE BOOKE.

## *The first Chapter.*

### *Of Iudgement.*

**I**udgement is the seconde Parte of Logike, concerning the ordering of reasons, whereby they may be the better iudged of, which order sometimes is altered by additions, leauings out, or displacing of any thing, & this is called the hiding of Art, when it is done artificially and to good purpose.

It is eyther of  $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{One sentence, called an Axiome, and that parte is called} \\ \text{Axiomaticall.} \\ \text{Noe sentences.} \end{array} \right.$

An Axiome or sentence is that ordering of one reason with an other, whereby a thing is saide to bee or not to be.

The partes of an Axiome.  $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{The couple or bande} \\ \text{are } \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{The partes coupled.} \end{array} \right. \end{array} \right.$

The couple is that which ioyneth the other partes together.

The partes coupled,  $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{The former.} \\ \text{are } \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{The latter.} \end{array} \right. \end{array} \right.$

The former is that parte which goeth before, and is called the Antecedent.

The latter which followeth, and is called the Consequent, as in this: *A first answer appeareth wrath*: where *a first answer* being a cause, and the former parte of this Axiome, is ioyned by the couple, *doth*, with the effect and latter parte, *appeareth anger*.

An axiome or one sentence is eyther  $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Affirming, or} \\ \text{Affirmatiue.} \\ \text{Denying, or negative.} \end{array} \right.$

An affirming axiome is, whose couple doth affirme.

Denying is, whose couple doth denie. And although in our english tongue Deniall is set after the bande, yet in reason and in other tongues, it goeth before, and denieth the bande.

From this affirming or denying, commeth the gaynsaying or contradiction of axiome;

## THE ARTE

comes, which is when the selfe same axiome is plainly and flatly affirmed and denied. As in this: *Good workes do iustifie, good workes do not iustifie.*

An axiome is true, when it is so affirmed or denied, as the thing is in deed, otherwise false.

V Which both are eyther, } Necessary or  
Doubtfull.

Necessary when the axiome is true or false without exception: yet to a generall axiome to make it necessarily true, exception is to bee added: as *whosoever putteth away his wife, except for the cause of fornication, committeth adulterie.*

Doubtfull, when the truth or falsehood is uncertayne, which is called a contingent axiome, As:

*God is good,* is necessarily true.

*The Diuill is good,* is necessarily false.

*The godly doe prosper in outwards blessings,* is doubtful.

And here the iudgement must be according to the proprietie of the axiome: as, that which is necessarily true, must be absolutely graunted or affirmed: and that which is necessarily false, must be absolutely denied: and that which is doubtful must be doubtfully affirmed, or denied: or els for certaintie distinguish howe farre you denie, and how farre you graunt.

Now, when axiomes are exactly judged, they must not onely be according to this rule of truth, but also according to the rules of rightfull placing or rightfulness, and wise placing, or rule of wisdom.

The rule of rightfull placing is, when reasons are placed in an axiome, according to there proper considerations, spoken of before in Invention: as, the proper forme with the proper thing formed, the proper subiect, with the proper adiect: the proper generall, with the proper speciall. As, *All going aside from the rule of godlinesse is sinne,* which both is necessarily true, & the proper generall is affirmed of the proper speciall. But it is contraywise in this axiome: *The lawe of God is perfect.* For perfectnes is common to many other things, as to God and his creatures in their first creation.

V Wise placing, is whe reasons which may be equally affirmed or denied one of the other, are so placed, as that which is best known be in the first place, as in the placing of reasons, the cause must be before the effect, the subiect before the adiect, &c. As, *All going from the rule of godlinesse is sinne,* is wisely placed, because the proper generall is set before the proper speciall, which is, as it may be turned, *All sinne is going from the rule of rightness,* it is truly and rightly placed, but not according to this exact rule, for the proper speciall, not so manifest as the proper generall, is notwithstanding set before, which yet, 1. To 5. is placed according to this rule. *All unrighteousnes is sin.*

## The seconde Chapter.

THE sortes of an axiome is eyther } Single, called Simple.  
Double, called compounde.

A single axiome is an axiome, whose band is noted out by *is*, or *are*, or some such like. V Where this is to be marked, that in the exact placing of this axiome, nothing els must be in the second part, but that whereof the first is affirmed or denied: as in this example: *Every sin is to be blamed:* this is a simple axiome, and exactly placed. But *every man is lying to be blamed;* is not exactly placed. And in this kinde of axiome, all arguments

# OF LOGIKE

gumantes. except diuers, and comparisōs, and distributions may bee coupled, so that the agreeable bee alwayes affirmed, and the disagreeable be alwayes denied, As, *God doth iustifie*, where the cause and the effecte are coupled together. *Every manne is a lyar*. VVhere the subiecte and the adiunct are coupled together. *God cannot lye*: where we see that two contrary arguments are coupled together. Ioh. 1. *In the beginning was the worde*: Here the partes are turned: for it must be thus vnderstood: The worde was in the beginning. So, *God is in deede true: there in deede aboundeth*, Coloss. 2. 2. *All which perishe in the wfe, according to the commandement of man, here prescribed, according to the commandementes of menne, or some suche thing to bee vnderstoode*. So Iohn 1. 21. *No*, meaning I am not the prophet, where both antecedent and consequent is wanting.

The single axiome { Generall.  
is eyther { Speciall.

Generall is, when the latter part is generally referred or attributed to the former As, *All men are lyars*.

Speciall is, when the latter part is specially attributed to the former,

Speciall is eyther { Particular.  
{ Proper.

Particular is a speciall, when the latter part is referred to some of the former, but without certaine limitation as, *Some men are alreadye turned back vnto Satan*. VVhere contradiction must be a generall negative axiome: as, *No men turned vnto Satan*, *Allo, Some men haue faith: No man hath faith*.

Proper is, when the latter part is referred to the former being one singular or proper thing: As, *Paul is the Apostle of Iesw Christ: whose contradiction is, Paul is not the Apostle of Christ*.

Thus much of a single axiome.

Nowe followeth the double or compoude.

A double or compoude axiome is, which is made of diuers single axiomes, whose band or couple is noted out with *and*, or *if*, *although*, &c, which ioyn sentences together, and are commonly called coniunctions.

Here the turning of parts is very common and to be marked, & especially because of the forme of prouing which shal follow: as *If thou keepe my Sabbath, I will blesse thee*. E. say. 5. 1. 3. 14. which must be thus turned, if one will bring it to this certaine forme of prooffe. *If I will blesse thee, thou must keepe my Sabbath, but thou dost not: Ergo*.

Also a compoude axiome according to the nature of his coniunctions,

It is eyther { Gathering, or congregatiue.  
{ Seuering, or segregatiue.

A gathering or congregatiue axiome is, which by such bands or coniunctiōs coupleth together the agreeable and disagreeable arguments, affirming the one, and denying the other.

The gathering axiome { Coupling or copulatiue.  
is eyther { Knitting or connexiue.

Coupling or copulatiue is that, whose bande or couple is, *and*, *also*, &c. Iames. 3. 17. *The wisdom that is from above, is first pure, then peaceable, and gentle, and easie to be intreated, and full of mercy and good-will, &c.*

The true iudgement of this copulatiue axiome, dependeth vpon the truth of euerie particular part. For if all the parts be true, it is a true axiome: If one onely be false it is a false axiome.

## THE ARTE

Hereunto may be referred the full comparifons and the fimilitudes, as, Looke what number of ftarres there be in the heauens, *fo many in number that thy fcede bee*: faide God to Abraham. Whole contradictions, are the denial of euery part.

A knitting or connexiue axiome is, whose couple is, *If, as, if you were the children of Abraham you woulde doe the workes of Abraham*. VVhose contradiction is, If the first be, yet the seconde doth not follow. So that when we iudge this axiome to be true, wee must iudge the partes to be truly and necessarily knit together. VVhiche may be though the partes be both false: as in this example: The Iewes neither were Abrahams children, neither did the workes of Abraham. This axiome is doubtfull, when the partes and the following are doubtfull: As paule in the shippe: *If you obey my counsell, you shall not perishe*. Hitherto must be referred the bande which is expresse by the woordes of time; as, *VVhen wee were Gentiles, we sined according to the flesh*. Also, *when I was a child, I spake as a child*.

A seuering or segregatiue axiome is, whose couple or coniunction is seuering, and therefore is fittest to dispose the disagreeable arguments.

It is eyther  $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Discerning, or discretiue.} \\ \text{Disioyning, or disunctioniue.} \end{array} \right.$

Discerning is, whose couple or coniunction is discerning. Therefore of disagreeable argumentes it is fittest to dispose the diuers. As, although Esau fought the blessing through teares, yet he found no place to repentance: whose contradiction is the denial of the principall coniunction, as, not although. This axiome is iudged to bee true and wittie, when as the partes be not onely true, but also diuers: otherwile it is iudged false or ridiculous; as although a man be a foole, yet he wanteth wile.

The disioyning or disunctioniue axiome, is whose couple or coniunction is disioyning as, *Rom. 14. 4. Every one standeth or falleth*. &c.

Here the contradiction doth not necessarily make the parts true or false: For the disunction may be true, although the parts seuerally considered be doubtfull: As *whether Peter was, at Rome, or not*. VVhere we see the disunction to be necessary though the partes be doubtfull.

Thus much of the Iudgement of one sentence or axiome.

Now followeth of moe sentences or axiomes.

## The fourth Chapter.

THE Iudgement of moe Axiomes is, when one axiome is inferred one vpon another, or drawn one out of another.

It is eyther  $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{A certaine frame of prouing, called a Syllogisme.} \\ \text{Or a plaine and perfect way of handling any thing, called} \\ \text{Methode.} \end{array} \right.$

A frame of prouing or Syllogisme, is that placing of an argument found out, with a question in three Axiomes, where the two first being graunted, the third doth necessarily follow. Therefore when an axiome is doubtfull, it is made a question, and for prooffe of the truth, we must inuent a third reason, and place it with the question after the forenamed order.

The partes of a Syllogisme  $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Former, or antecedent.} \\ \text{are, } \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Latter or consequent.} \end{array} \right. \end{array} \right.$

The

## OF LOGIKE

The former or antecedent, is that vpon which the conclusio is inferred or brought in.

If hath two partes, { The propounder, or proposition.  
{ The applier or assumption.

The proposition is the first part, wherein at the least the latter part of the question is placed with the reason found out.

The assumption is the second part which is taken out of the proposition.

The latter part or conclusion is that part which is inferred vpon the antecedent, concluding the question in this sort:

*Every sinner is subiect to condemnation.*

*Every man is a sinner.*

*Ergo*

*Every man is subiect to condemnation.*

In this example we see first, that the conclusion standing vpon two argumentes, the subject and adiunct, is made a question: and by the third argument, *Sinner*, the affirmatiue is proued true, by the fit placing of it in these three axiomes, wherein at least the last part of the question is placed in the proposition.

Here marke that if any part be wanting, it is called the kinde of an imperfect Sillogisme, which is called an Enthimeme, or an holding in the minde. If any thing be added more then the axiomes, usually placed in a Sillogisme, it is called a prosillogisme, or an addition to a Sillogisme, or seconde proofo. The partes of a Sillogisme are oftentimes disorderly placed, as in this example, where the Apostle proueth that wee are iustified by faith:

*Eythor we are iustified by faith, or by the workes of the law.*

*But not by the workes of the law.*

*Ergo*

*By faith.*

Here the proposition is wanting: the assumption is found in the 20. verse of the 3. Chap. the conclusion in the 22. verse, and in the end of the 20. verse there is a prosillogisme or second proofo, whereby the assumption is proued: as thus: *By the law cometh the knowledge of sinne: Therefore we are not iustified by it.*

## The fiftie Chapter.

**O**F Sillogismes, some are simple or single, others are compound or double.

The simple is that wherein the latter part of the question is placed in the proposition, and the former part in the assumption.

This is sayde to be affirmatiue, when that all the parts doe affirm: negative, when that all the parts doe denie. General, where the conclusion & proposition or assumption be general: speciall, when one of them onely is general: proper, when both of them are proper.

There are two sortes of a

simple Sillogisme: { The one more plaine.

{ The other more artificiall.

A more plaine is, whose order of placing is more plain then the rest, and it is when the reason found out to proue a particular question, goeth before in both parts, and is affirmatiue in the assumption.

*All our fathers had the same Sacraments in substance.*

*Many of the Fathers were not saved, therefore some were not saved that had the Sacraments in substance.*

C3

The

# IN THE ARTE

The proposition is in the 1. of the Cor. the 10. The Assumption, ver. 5. which sort of simple Sillogismes, because of the plainnes of it, is very seldom found set forth in all his parts, but most commonly in this order: The argument being put for an example

*Some putting awayes good conscience, haue made shipwracke of faith, as Alexander and Hymanus. 1. Tim. 1.*

**The affirmative generall.**

*All the infidels shal be saved:*

*All the infidels shal raigne with Christ: Therefore*

*Some that raigne with Christ, shal be saved:*

**The negative with the proposition generall.**

*No hypocritical caller vpon God shal be saved:*

*All hypocritical callers vpon God, say, Lords, Lords, Therefore*

*Some that say, Lords, Lords, shal not be saved.*

**Affirmative speciall.**

*Some who sel in the wilderness, heard the word,*

*All who sel in the wilderness, tempted God. Therefore*

*Some that heard the word, tempted God, Heb. 6. 3.*

**Negative speciall.**

*No right Papist is a true subiect:*

*Some right Papist is a Iesuite: Therefore*

*Some Iesuite is not a true subiect.*

**Affirmative proper.**

*Abraham beleued God, and it was imputed to him for righteousness:*

*Abraham was a man, Therefore*

*Some man beleued, and it was imputed to him for righteousness.*

**Negative proper.**

*Paule was not condemned:*

*Paule was an Apostle, Therefore*

*Some Apostle was not condemned.*

Lesse plaine Sillogismes are those whose frame of concluding is not so plaine: and here the proposition must be alwaies generall or proper, & the conclusion negative, if eyther proposition or assumption be negative: and of this there are two sorts. The first, where the reasons found out doe follow both in the proposition and assumption, and must be denied in one of them.

**The first generall:**

*Every true Christian can iustifie his religion by his works:*

*The dissimbling professor cannot iustifie his religion by his works, Therefore*

*The dissimbling professor is no true Christian.*

**The second generall.**

*Every Christian loueth God:*

*No transgressor of the commandment loueth God, Therefore*

*No transgressor of the commandment is a true Christian.*

**The first speciall.**

*A Pastor is not an Apostle:*

*Paule is an Apostle, Therefore*

*Paule is no Pastor.*

**The second speciall.**

*An Apostle may preach throughout the world:*

Archippus



## OF LOGIKE.

*Archippus may not preach throughout the world.*

*Therefore Archippus is not an Apostle.*

The first proper.

*Judas Iscariote was not the servant of Christ.*

*Judas the brother of James was the true servant of Christ.*

*Therefore Judas Iscariote was not the brother of James.*

The second proper.

*Timothy was an Evangelist.*

*Pauls was not an Evangelist.*

*Timothy was not Pauls.*

Therefore

Of the 2. sorts, Of a lesse plaine Sillogisme or more  
fully expressed.

In the second kinde, the reason found out goeth before in the proposition, & followeth in the assumption affirmatively:

The general affirmative:

*Every sinner is subject to condemnation.*

*Every man is a sinner: Therefore*

*Every man is subject to condemnation.*

The general negative.

*No sinner is justified by his works:*

*Every man is a sinner: Therefore*

*No man is justified by his works:*

The speciall affirmative.

*Every Apostle must preach the Gospell:*

*Pauls is an Apostle: Therefore*

*Pauls must preach the Gospell.*

The speciall Negative.

*No dissimbler was ever approved of God:*

*Ananias was a dissimbler, Therefore*

*Ananias was never approved of God.*

The proper affirmative.

*The sonne of God is the true Messias:*

*I am the sonne of God: Therefore*

*I am the true Messias.*

The proper negative.

*Iohn did not deny Christ:*

*This Evangelist is Iohn: Therefore*

*This Evangelist did not deny Christ.*

Thus much of the simple Sillogisme.

Now followeth the compound.

## The fift Chapter.

**T**HE compound or double sillogisme is, where the whole question maketh the one part of the proposition affirmed and compounded, & the argument found out maketh the other part of the proposition.

To deny any part in a compound Sillogisme, is to set downe the contradiction thereof.

The compound Sillogisme is Connexive, or knitting together  
is eyther & Disjunctive, or leaving, or disjoyning.

The

# THE ARTE

The knitting together or connexiue is whose proposition is connexiue or framed with wordes which knit together sentences. This is of two sortes: The first sorte is when the former part of the proposition, is repeated affirmatiuely in the assumption, and the latter part in the conclusion.

*If God doe iustifie the faithfull, no man may condemne them.*

*But God doth iustifie the faithfull, Ergo*

*No man may condemne them.*

Here oftentimes the former part of the proposition maketh not the assumption, but that which is greater or of more force to conclude then it is.

*If the Magistrate doe iustly hate thee for thine offences, then thou oughtest to tremble;*

*But God of heauen hateth thee iustly for thine offences, Therefore thou oughtest to tremble.*

The same kinde of Syllogisme is framed by a worde of time, which hath the same form: with the other. As:

*If, or sining, or when we are dead with Christ, let vs liue with him:*

*But we are dead with Christ, therefore let vs liue with him.*

The second kinde of a knitting or connexiue Syllogisme.

The second kind of a knitting or connexiue Syllogisme is, when the consequent or latter part of the proposition is denied in the assumption. that the former also maye be denied in the conclusion. As :

*If Abraham were iustified by workes, then he hath to glory with God:*

*But he hath not to glorie with God, Therefore*

*He is not iustified by workes. Rom. 4. 1.*

A disioyning or disiunctiue Syllogisme.

It is that whose proposition is disioyned, and is framed after two sortes. The first doth deny one part of the proposition in the assumption, and concludeth the other in the conclusion. As:

*A man is iustified, either by workes or faith:*

*But not by workes Therefore*

*By faith,*

*Or thus:*

*Man is iustified by Faith or workes:*

*But not by workes. Therefore*

*By faith,*

The second frame is that which is made of a disioyned axiome, affirmed in both partes, and affirmeth one part in the assumption, that it may denie or take away the other in the conclusion as thus:

*Faithfull men must eyther be saved or condemned.*

*But they shalbe saved;*

*Therefore not condemned.*

The same Syllogisme is also made of a coupled or copulatiue axiome being denied, because it hath the same force with a disioyned axiome.

*YVe can not serue both God and Mammon.*

*But we serue God,*

*Therefore not Mammon.*

*Or thus*

*YVe cannot serue both Mammon and God,*

*But: God:*

*Therefore not Mammon.*

Thus much of the certayne frame of proouing or Syllogisme, Nowe followeth the plaine and perfect way of handling anything, or Methode.

Methode.

## The seventh Chapter.

**M**ETHODE is the iudgement of more axiomes, whereby many and diuers axiomes being framed according to the properties of an axiome perfectly or exactly iudged, are so ordered as that the easiest and most general bee set downe first, the harder are less general next, vntill the whole matter be so conuayed, as all the partes may best agree with themselves, & be best kept in memorie.

For as we consider in an axiome truth or falshood, in a Sillogismus, necessary following or not following, so in Methode the best and perfectest, the worst and troublefomest way to handle a matter.

Therefore according to this perfect way, the definition of that which is to be handled, must be first set downe, and then the diuision of the same into the members, & the general properties of the same, and then the diuers sortes of it, if there be any: so proceeding vntill by fit and apt passages or transitions, the whole be so farre handled, that it can be no more debited.

A passage or transition is the bande of Methode, whereby one member of a diuision is ioyned to the other, which thing refresheth the Reader or hearer, and helpeth the memorie. Such is that in the Acts, 1. Chap. 1. *The first Treatise, Theropitus I haue made of all things which Iesus began to say to doe, &c.* And so goeth to the other historie of the Acts of the Apostles.

Examples hereof you may see in the distribution of the effectes, and in all other things highly handled, and in the treatise of household gouernment following.

Nowe this Methode because it is so agreeable to reason, and easie to be practised, is for the most part followed of all writers or speakers, yet so as they may and do according to their matter, time, place, persons, and all such circumstances, wisely alter, change, or hide the same: and then it is called the hiding or concealing, or cryptus of Methode, whereas they leaue out the former orderly placing of sidentions, Diuisions, and transitions, & do take in diuers repetitions, declarations, makings lightsome, enlargings, or amplifications, prouings of the thing, preventing of objections, out going from the matter, called digressions, as it shall make mosse fit for their purpose. At which shall appeare in that which is set downe for the practise of Logike.

FINIS.

D

The Art

# The Arte of Rhetorike, plainly set foorth in our English tounge, easie both to be understoode and practised.

**RHETORIKE** is an Arte of speaking finely.

Garnishing of speech, called Eloquention.

It hath two partes, } Garnishing of the man of utterance, called

} Pronunciation.

Garnishing of speech is the first part of Rhetorike, whereby the speech it selfe is beautified and made fine.

It is *synthetike*. } The fine manner of wordes called a Trope.

} The fine shape or frame of speech, called a figure.

The fine manner of wordes is a garnishing of speech whereby one word is drawn from his first proper signification to another, as in this sentence: *Some lyeth at the doore* where *some* is put for the punishment of sinne adioyned vnto it; *lyeth at the doore* signifieth at hand, as that which lyeth at the doore, is redie to be brought in.

This changing of wordes was first found out by necessity, for the want of wordes, afterward confirmed dy delight, because such wordes are pleasant and gracious to the eare. Therefore this change of signification must be manifest, and as it were manifestly that it may seeme rather to be led by the hand to another signification, than to be driven by force vnto the same. Yet sometimes this fine manner of speech, is vnto the perfection, and then it is.

Either, } The abuse of this fine speech, called *Kataphresis*, or

} The excess of this finenesse, called *Hyperbole*.

By *kataphresis* we say, *that which speech although it seeme very hard yet it doeth not without some finenesse of speech vnto this much.* That we, seeke not a righteousness, nor find the lawe of God, and that when we seee God without all sinne, yet that they take heed, that some beare the dominion over them. *As, My teares are my meate day and night.* *As, that hath more a mee in his hand, than the heade of my head.* Both whiche doe vnto by an excess of speech, a great sorrow, and a great number of enemies.

The abuse of speech is when the change of speech is hard, strange, and vnwonted, as in the first example.

The excess of speech is, when the change of signification is very high and lofty as in the second example. And Psal 6. 7.

But the excellencie or finenesse of wordes or Tropes is most excellent, when diuers are } Shut vp in one, or

} Continued in many

An example of the first sort is in the 2. King. *I pray thee let me haue a double portion of thy spirite:* where by *spirite* is meant, the gift of the spirite, and by *thy spirite* the giftes of the spirite like to thine.

The coniguance of Tropes called an Allegorie, is when one kinde of Trope is so continued, as, Lookewith what kinde of matter it be begunne, with the same it be ended: So in the 23. Psalme, the care of God towards his Church, is set forth by the wordes proper to a shepheard. So in the whole booke of Canticles, the sweete conference of Christe

# OF RHETORIKE

and his Church, is set down by the word proper to the husbands and themselves. So old age is set down by this garnishing of speech. Eccl. vi. 6.

Hitherto of the properties of a fine manner of wordes, called a Tropo.

Now the diuers tropes so follow.

They are those which note out and are with  
 No comparison or No respect of  
 Some comparison Some respect.

The first is double. The change of name called a Metonymie.

The mocking speech called an Ironie.

The change of name is where the name of a thing is put for the name of a thing agreeing with it.

When the cause is put for the thing caused, and contrariwise.  
 The thing to which any thing is adioyned, is put for the thing  
 adioyned, and contrariwise.

The change of name of the cause is when the matter is put for the thing  
 the cause is when the matter is put for the thing.

Of the maker, when the finder out, or the author of the thing, or the instrument whereby the thing is done, is put for the thing made. So Moses is put for his writings. So David is put for his liberality, or suffering himself for the sake of his people. So faith is put for religious service of God. So the thing caused, it is, so the cause is put for the thing.

Rule. Thou art dust, and to dust shalt thou returne, that is, one made of dust.

Now on the other side, when the thing caused or the effect is put for any of these causes. So the Gospel of God is called the power of God to salvation, that is, the instrument of the power of God. So Louis is said to be beautiful, because it causes one to be beautiful. So Paul's faith, the bread that we breake, is the communion of the body and blood of Christ, that is an instrument of the communion of the body of Christ. So the body is said to be an earthly tabernacle, that is, a tabernacle made of earth.

The change of name, or Metonymie, where the subject or that which hath any thing adioyned is put for the thing adioyned or adioynt. So the place is put for the person, that is, in the place, set things house in an order, that is, thy household matters. If the father of the Church and Genuer, that is, the people in Sodoma and Genuer. So Moses' chair is put for the doctrine taught in Moses' chair. So the Church and Jerusalem come in, that is all the men in Ierusalem and Jerusalem. So before, faine was put for the punishment of faine. Let his blood rest upon us, and our children, that is, the punishment which shall follow his death. So Christ laid down my body, that is, a signe or sacrament of my body. This wine is the blood of the new testament, that is, a signe or scale of the new testament in my blood. So Iohn faith, He saw the spirit descending in the likeness of a Dove, that is, the signe of the spirit.

On the other side, the adioynt is put for the thing to which it is adioyned. As, Christ is called our hope. That is, that is, on whom our hope did depende. So we are justified by faith, that is, by Christ applied by faith. So, have in the fulfilling of the day, that is, those things to which it is adioyned, hope for the thing desired for. Rom. vi. 16. In the Epistle to the Ephesians, The day of our call, that is, the manner, continuation, and the deeds of men in the day.

Hitherto of the Metonymie or change of name.

Now followeth the mocking speech, called Ironie.

It is a trope, where the speaker saith the contrary to what he meaneth, or what he thinketh.

## The second Chapter.

**T**HE mocking Trope is, when one contrarie is signified by another, as God said, *Man is like to one of vs.* So Christe saith: *Sleepe on, and yet by and by, Arise, let vs go.* So Paule saith: *You are wise and I am a foole.*

This Trope is perceiued either by the contrariety of the matter or the manner of vterance, or both: So Elias saide to the Prophets of Baal: *Crie aloud,* &c. So the lewes said vnto Christe: *Haile king of the Iewes.*

Hitherto appertaineth the passing by a thing, which yet with a certaine elegancie noteth it. So Philemon. 19. *That I say not thou owest thy selfe vnto me.*

Hitherto of the fineness of wordes which respect no diuision.

Now followeth that which respecteth diuision, called Synecdoche.

A Synecdoche is when the name of the whole is given to the parte, or the name of the part to the whole.

And it is double. ¶ When the whole is put for the member, and contrarily. ¶ When the generall or whole kinde is put for the speciall, or some sort, and contrarily.

So S. Iohn. *Not only for our finnes, but for the finnes of the whole worlde.* So rightousnesse a member of goodnesse is put for all goodnesse. So rightousnesse is put for all manner of finnes.

Examples of the second sort, as these: So Israel is put for those of Iuda sometimes. So nations for the Heathen. A minister of Christ, for an Apostol of Christe, Rom. 1. A minister put for a distributor, Rom. 12.

On the other side, one sort or speciall is put for the whole sorte or generall in the examples following. In the Lordes prayer bread, one help of life is put for all helps: *This day, one time* for all times. So Salomon saith, *The thing of the day in his day,* that is, the thing of the time in his time.

So sometimes lesse is spoken, and yet more is vnderstoode, which is called diminution or *Miosis*, as, *I am,* saith to him that knoweth howe to doe, *well and doth not,* it is *fit*, that is, a great sinne. So our Sauour Christe saith, *if they had not knowne, they had had no finnes,* that is, no suche great sinne as they haue nowe. Likewise the denial by comparison. So Salomon sayeth, *Receiue my wordes and not siluer,* that is, my wordes rather then siluer. So Paule saith, *I was sent to preach and not to baptise,* that is, not so much to baptise as to preach.

Hitherto of the fineness of wordes, which note out no comparison. Now followeth the fineness of wordes which noteth our comparison, called a Metaphor.

## The third Chapter.

**A** Metaphor is when the like is signified by the like: as, 1. Cor. The Apostle saith: *Doctrines must be tryed by fier,* that is, the euidence of the wordes spirite trying doctrine as fier doth metals. So Christe is said to *baptise with fier,* where fier is put for the power of the holy Ghost purging as fier. So Christ saith, *None shall vnto him the kingdom of God, but he that is borne of the holy Ghosts and water.* So Paule calleth himselfe the *father of the Corinthians,* who saith that he begot them in Christ. So he calleth Timothy his *naturall sonne* in the faith.

Hitherto of a Tropes or garnishing of speech in one worde, where the Metaphor is most vsuall, then the change of name, then the Synecdoche, & laste of all the ironie. Now followeth the fine framor shape of speche, called a figure.



## OF LOGIKE.

A Figure is a garnishing of speech, wherein the course of the same is chaunged from the more simple and plaine maner of speaking, vnto that which is more full of excellencie & grace. For as in the singnesse of words or a trope, wordes are considered asunder by themselves: so in the fine shape or frame of speech or a figure, the apte and pleasant ioyning together of many wordes is noted.

The garnishing of the shape of speech or a  $\S$  In wordes.

Figure is garnishing of speech  $\S$  In a sentence.

The garnishing of speech in wordes called *Figura dictionis*, is wherein the speache is garnished by the pleasant and sweet sound of wordes ioyned together.

This is either  $\S$  In them easure of soundes.

$\S$  In the repetition of soundes.

The measure of soundes is  $\S$  Poets, with vs called Rymers.

belonginge either to  $\S$  Oratours, with vs called eloquent pleaders.

The first is the measure of soundes by certayne  $\S$  Ryme.

and continual spaces. And it is eyther.  $\S$  Verse.

Ryme is the first sort, containing a certeyne measure of Syllables ending alike, and these in the mother tongues are most fit for Psalmes, songs or Sonets.

Verfes are the second sort, containing certayne feete fitly placed.

A foote is a measure framed by the length & shortnes of Syllables. For the several fortes where of, as also of the verfes made of them, because we haue no worthy examples in our English tongue, we iudge the large handling of them shoulde be more curious then necessary.

The measure of sounds belonging to Orators is that which as it is not vncertain, so it differeth altogether from ryme and verse, & is very chageable with it selfe. Therefore in that eloquent speache you must altogether leaue ryme and verse, vnlesse you alleadge it for authority and pleasure.

In the beginning of the sentence litle care is to be had, in the middle least of all, and in the end chiefeest regard is to be had, because the fall of the sentence is most marked, & therefore least it fall out to be harsh and vnpleasaunt both to the mind and eare, there must be most variety and chaunge.

Now this chaunge must not be aboue fixe syllables from the end, and that must be set downe in feet of two syllables.

And thus much of garnishing of speech by the measure of soundes, rather to giue some taste of the same to the Readers, then to draw any to the curious & vnnecessary practise of it.

Now followeth the repeating of soundes.

### *The fourth Chapter.*

R Epetition of sounds is  $\S$  The like.  $\S$  sounde.  
either of  $\S$  The Vnlike

Of the like is  $\S$  Continued to the end  $\S$  of the same sentence,  
 $\S$  eyther  $\S$  Broken of  $\S$  of diuers.

Continued to the end of the same sentence is when the same sound is repeated without anything coming betwene, except a parithesis, that is, something put in with out the which notwithstanding the sentence is full. And it is a ioyning of the same sound, as Rom. 1. *An vnrighteous formation, wickednes.* And in the prayer of Christ, *My God, my God, from men by thine hand O Lord, from men, &c.* P sal. 17.

Co

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Continued in a diuers sentence. Redoubling, called Anadiplosis, is either a pleasant dyming, called Clysmax, and the beginning of the sentence following. As, Psal. 9. 8. The Lord also will be a refuge to the poore, a refuge I say in due time. Psal. 48. 14. For this God is our God. But more plaine in the 8. As we haue heard so haue we seene in the vija of the Lord of hostes, in the cur of our God, God will establish it for ever.

A pleasant dyming is a redoubling continued by diuers degrees or steppes of the same sounds: As Rom. 8. 17, If we be children, we be heires, even heires of God, annexed with Christ. Rom. 8. 30. Whom he predestinated, them also he called, and whom he called, them also he iustified, & whom he iustified, them also he glorified. Also Rom. 9. 14-15.

And hitherto of the same found continued to the end.

Now followeth the same found broken of.

The fyste Chapter.

THE same found broken of is a repetition. Beginning of the same in the In the end.

In the beginning is called Anaphora, a bringing of the same again. As. Ro. 8. 38.

Nor death, nor life, nor Angells, nor principallities, nor powers, nor things present nor things to come, nor height, nor depth, nor any other creature shall be able to separate us from the love of God, which is in Christe I. say our Lords. So likewise Ephe. 4. 11. Some to be Apostles, some Preachers, some prophets, some Euangelistes, So Gal. Nor Iewe, nor Gentile, nor bonds, nor free. So likewise Hebr. 11. 1. 2.

Repetition of the same found in the ende is called Epistrophe, a turning to the same found in the end: So Ezech. Behold greater abominations then these, Lament. 3. 1. 4. Let vs lift vp our heartes with our hands vnto God in the heauens, wee haue sinned, and haue rebelled, therefore thou hast not spared.

VVhen both of these are ioyned together, it is called a coupling or Symploce. As, 2. Cor. 6. 4. to the 11. But in all things we approue our selues, as the Ministers of God, in much patience, in afflictions, in necessities, in distresses, in stripes, in prisons, in tumults, in labours. By watching, by fasting, by puritie, by knowledge, by suffering, by kindnesse, by the holy Ghoste, by loue conserued, by the words of truth, by the power of GOD, by the armour of righteousnesse, on the right hande, and on the left, by honour and dishonour, by euill report and good report, as deceiuers and yet true, as vnknown and yet known, as dying and yet beholde we liue, as chastened, and yet not killed, as striking and yet alwaies restoring, as pore and yet make manye riche, as hauing nothing, and yet possessing all things, See also 2. Cor. 22. 23.

Hitherto of the repetitions in the same place.

Now of those that doe enterchange their place.

They are eyther Epanalepsis, which signifieth to take backe.

Epanados, which signifieth a turning to the same tune.

The first is when the same found is repeated in the beginning and the ending. As My sonne Abshen, my sonne, Sam. 19. 1.

Epanados, is when the same found is repeated in the beginning and the middle in the middle and the ende, as Ezech. 35. 6. I will prepare thee vnto blood, and blood shall pur-

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*For thou except thou hate blood, even blood, thou shalt pursue thee. And 1. Thes. 1. So that he that doth see  
as God in the temple of God, sheweth himselfe that he is God.*

Hitherto of the repetition of those soundes which are alike.

Now of those that are unlike.

## The sixte Chapter.

Unlike are { A smal chaunging of the name, as Paronomasia.  
A smal chaunging of the end or case, as  
Polypotton.

A smal chaung of name is, when a worde by the chaunge of one letter or Sylla-  
ble, the signification also is changed, As, *parique, experience, Rom. 5. 4. 19. We walk after  
the flesh, not warre in the flesh, So by honor and dishonor, as unknown, and yet known.*

A smal chaunging of the ende or case is when wordes of the same beginning re-  
banded by diuers ends; *Christ being raised from the dead, death no more, death hath no more power  
ouer him, Hee that doth righteous is righteous. If ye knowe that he is righteous, know ye that he that doth  
righteously, is borne of him.* And of both these there are manye in the Scripture, but the  
translations cannot reach them.

Hitherto of the garnishing of the shape of speach in words.

Now followeth the garnishing of the shape of speach in a sentence.

## The seuenth Chapter.

Garnishing of the frame of speache in a sentence, is a garnishing of the shape of  
speach, or a figure, which for the forceable mouing of affectiōs, doth after a  
beautifie the sence and very meaning of a sentence. Because it hath in it a certain  
manly maiesty, which farre surpasseth the softe delicacy or dainties of the former  
figures.

It is eyther the garnishing of speach { Alone.  
with others.

The garnishing of speach alone, is when as the sentence is garnished without  
speach had to other. And it is eyther in regarde { Of the matter.  
Of the person.

In regard of the matter, { A crying out, called Exclamation.  
is eyther { A pulling or calling backe of himselfe, called  
Renouation.

A crying out or Exclamation is the first, which is set forth by a worde, of calling  
out. Sometimes of wonder, As, *Rom. 8. O the depth of the iudgements of God. Psal. 3. O Lord  
how excellent is thy name!*

Sometimes of pity, also these wordes, *Beholds, alas, oh, be signes of this figure. As, O Ie-  
rusalem, Ieru, Ieru, which flourest the prophetes. Sometimes of desperation, As, my sinne is greater  
then sinne by far, Behold thou driuest me out, &c. Sometimes of wishing, As, O Lord of hea-  
uē, how amiable are thy tabernacles. Sometimes of disdayning, as, *Rom. 7 in the end. O misfe-  
ritable Ierusalem, that I am, who shal deliuer me from this body of sinne? Sometimes of mocking, as they  
which said to our sauour Christ, A thou that, &c.**

Sometimes

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Sometimes of cursing & detestation, as in David, *Let their table be made a snare, & bow down their backe alwaies.* Also when this Figure is vsed in the ende of a sentence, it is called a shooting out of the voyce or Eniphoema, as when the finnes of Isabell were spoken against, this is added at the end, *Seemed it a little to her to doe thus and thus?* So after the high setting forth of the name of God, David shureth vp his praise with this: *Blessed be his glorious name, and let all the earth be filled with his glory.* Sometimes here is vsed a certaine liberty of speech, wherein is a kinde of secreete crying out: As, Peter. 3. Act. saith: *To men of Israell heare these wordes.* And Paule 1. Cor. 11. *Woulde God you could suffer a little my foolishnes, and iudged ye suffer me.*

Thus much of crying out.

Now followeth the Figure of calling backe, or reuocation.

Reuocation is when any thing is called backe, and it is as it were a coolinge and quenching of the heare of the exclamation that went before.

And this is eyther { A correction of ones selfe, called Epanorthosis,  
A holding of ones peace, called Apopiopefis.

Epanorthosis is correction, whe some thing is called back that went before: as *Paul correcteth his doubtfullnes of Agrippa.* his belife, when he saith, *Belonest thou King Agrippa, I know thou belonest Paul.* 1. Cor. 15. *I laboured more abundantly, then they all, yet not I, but the grace of God in me.*

A keeping off silence or Apopiopefis is when the course of the sentence begon is so stayed, as thereby some part of the sentence not being vttered, maye be vnderstood: So our Sauour Christ saith, *My soule is deauy: what shal I say.* Ihon. 12. 27.

Thus much of a Figure garnishing the speech alone in regard of the matter.  
Now followeth the garnishing of the speech alone in regard of the person.

## The eight Chapter.

**G**arnishing of the speache alone in regard of the person is double.

Eyther in { Turning to the person, called Apostrophe.  
Feyning of the person, called Profopoeia.

Apostrophe or turning to the person is when the speech is turned to another person, then the speech appointed did intend or requier. And this Apostrophe or turning is diuersly seene, according to the diuersitie of persons. Sometimes it turneth to a mans person, As David in the 6. Psalme, where hauing gathered argumentes of his fawtie, turneth hastily to the wicked, saying, *Away from me all ye workers of iniquitie: for the Lord hath heard the voyce of my petition.*

Sometimes from a man to God, as Psal. 3. David being dismayed with the number of his enimies, turneth himselfe to God, saying, *But thou Lord art my buckler, &c.*

Sometimes to vnreasonable creatures without sense, Esaj. 1. Esaj. 20. 1.

Profopoeia or a Feyning of the person is whereby we doe feyne another person speaking in our speech. And

It is double { Imperfect.  
Perfect.

Imperfect if when the speech of another person is set down lightly and indirectly. As in the Psal. 139. David bringeth in the wicked, *Yt he say vnto my soule, Eise as the birds vnder the willow.* A perfect

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A perfect Prosopoeia is when the whole sayings of the person is set down in our speech, with a shire-entring into the same, and a leaving it of. So VViff: Pro: 34. VVhere the entrance is in the first verses, her speech in the rest of the Chapter.

Hitherto of the figures of sentences concerning one speaking alone.  
Now follow the other which concerne the speeches of two.

## The 9. Chapter.

THE Y which concerne the speeches of two,  $\S$  In asking.  
are eyther  $\S$  In answering.

That of asking is  $\S$  In deliberation.  
eyther  $\S$  In preventing an obiection.

Deliberation is when we doe quer nowe and then aske as it were reasons of our consultation. whereby the minde of the hearers waivering in doubt, doth set downe some great thing.

This deliberation is eyther  $\S$  In doubting.  
 $\S$  In communication.

A doubting is a deliberating with our selves, as Paul. 1. Philip. 22. doubting whether it were better to die then to live, he garnisheth his speech on this manner: For I am greatly in doubt on both sides, desiring to be loosed, and to be with Christ which is best of all: nevertheless to abide in the flesh is more needfull for you.

Communication is a deliberation with others. Gal. 3. 1. 2. Of such Galatians, who hath bewitched you, that you should forsake the truth, to whom Jesus Christ before was described in your sight, and amongst you crucified? This surely would I leave of you, Reminded you of his spirit by the works of the law, or by the hearing of the words preached?

And hitherto of the figure of speech betwixens two called deliberation.

Now followeth the figure of speech betwixens two called the preventing of an obiection, or occupation.

Occupation is when wee doe bring an obiection and yeeld an answer unto it: Therefore this speech betwixens two in the first part is called the setting downe of the obiection, or occupation: in the latter part answering of the obiection, or the subiection: as Rom. 6. VVhat shall we say then? Shall we continue still in sinne, that grace may abound? In which words is set downe the obiection, the answering to these words: God forbid. And here this must be marked, that the obiection is many times wanting, which must be wisely supplied by considering the occasion and answer of it: As, 1. Tim. 5. They will marry, having condemnation. No, at least any might say, what for marrying? He answereth: No, For denying their first faith.

Hitherto of the figures of asking.

Now followeth the figures of answering.

They are eyther in  $\S$  Granting of a thing, which is called concession.  
 $\S$  Denying of a deed, called permission.

Suffering of a deed or permission is, when mockingly we give libertie to any deed, being neuer so filthy, as Revel. Let him that is filthy, be filthy still. And 1. Cor. 14. If any be ignorant let him be ignorant.

Con





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where faith doth note out both a iustifying faith and a dead faith.  
Doubtfulnes by a Tropes, is when a worde is taken properly, which is meant fig-  
uratiuely or contrariely. As:

*That which Christ saith is true?*

Christ fader that bread is his body,

Therefore it is true.

Where by body is meant the signe or Sacrament of his body.

Vnto the first a perfect Logician would answere, that the proposition is not an axiome necessarily true, according to the rule of truth, because of the doubtfulness of the old and new signification of *merit*. And if the worde be sarre werne out of vs: that it be not vnder stood, then the answere must be, I vnderstand it not, or put your axiome in plain wordes.

To the second, he would answer, that the proposition or first part is not according to the rule of righteousness, because the proper subject and adjoynt are not joyned together; which if it were, it should be, *¶ Proferri habet iustitiam, seu bonitatem suam, ut in se, et non in alio*, and then the assumption being in the same sense inferred, is false.

Vnto the third he would answer, that the assumption is not necessarily true, because if the word *Body* be taken properly, it is not then true that is set downe, but if it be taken figuratively, it is true, & therefore would bid him make the assumption necessarily true, and then say, Christ saith in proper wordes, *This is my body*, and then it is false.

### Hitherto of the fallacious in single words

**E** Now of those ioyned together.

It is either { Amphibolia, or the doubtfulness of speech.

It is either, { Exposition, or vnapt setting downe of the reason.

The first is when there is doubtfulness in the frame of speech, as thus: *If any shall say* *the words by a letter*; *saith him*. Where some referre, by a letter, to the first part of the sentence, and some to the latter, where the signification of the worde and right pointing doth shew, that it must be referred to the first.

The answer is, that the right and wife placing of the sentence is perverted.

Vnapt setting downe of the reason, is when the partes of the question and the reasons intreated is not fit downe in fit words: as.

*All praise is small:*

*Everie child of God doth sinne.*

Therefore every childe of God is enill

Here the answer, according to Logike, is that the assumption doth not take the argument out of the proposition, but putteth in another thing; and so it is no right frame of concluding, as appeareth by the definition of the assumption.

Hitherto of the deceits of reason which lie in words.

Now of the defects of Logic, called Sophisms.

It is either { General, or Special.

is either } Special.

The generall are those which cannot be referred to any part of Logike.

Begging of the question, called the *petitio principii*, is

They are either <sup>one</sup> perception of the principle.

Bringing of no proof, and then V.V. would not be concerned to

Begging of the question is when nothing is brought to prove, but the question,

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or that which is as doubtfull; As,

*That righteousness which is both by faith and workes doth iustifie.*

*But this rightness of iustice is inherent righteousness. Ergo*

Here the proposition in effect is nothing but a question.

*If together with the blood of Christ we muste make perfect satisfaction for our sinnes, before we come to heauen:*

*Then there must be purgatori for them that die without perfect satisfaction.*

*But the first is so. Ergo.* where the argument they bring is as doubtfull, & needeth as much prooffe as the question.

The answer is this out of the definition of the Syllogisme that there is no new argument inuented, therefore it cannot be a certaine frame of concluding.

Bragging of no prooffe is when that which is brought is too much, called redoing.

It is eyther  $\begin{cases} \text{Impertinent or another matter called Heterogenium,} \\ \text{A vaine repetition, called Tautologia.} \end{cases}$

Impertinent or not to the purpose is when any thing is brought to a proof, which is nothing neere to the matter in hand, whereunto the common prouerb giueth answer: *I aske you of chaunc, you answer mee of chaunce.*

A vaine repetition is, when the same thing in effect, though not in wordes is repeated, as they that after long time of prayer say, *Let vs pray.* And this fallacious our Saviour Christ condemneth in prayer, Mat. 5. and this is a fault in Methode.

Speciall are those which may be referred to certaine partes of Logike, and they are of two sorts.

Such as are referred  $\begin{cases} \text{To the spring of reasons, called inuention.} \\ \text{To iudgment.} \end{cases}$

Those referred to inuention are, when any thing is put for a reason which is not, as no cause for a cause, or effect for an effect, and so to the rest.

In the distribution this is a proper fallacion, when any thing simply or generally granted, thereby is inferred a certaine respect or speciall not meant nor intended: as,

*He that faith, there are not seven Sacraments, faith true:*

*But that faith, there are truly three, faith there are not seven:*

*Therefore be that faith three are there, faith true.*

The right answer is, that the proposition is not necessarie true, for there may be away to say, there are not seven, and yet affirme an vturth.

Fallacions of Iudgment are those that are referred to the

iudgment  $\begin{cases} \text{Of one sentence.} \\ \text{Of many sentences.} \end{cases}$

Of one sentence  $\begin{cases} \text{Properties of an axiome.} \\ \text{eyther to the } \begin{cases} \text{Sortes} \end{cases} \end{cases}$

To the properties, as when a true is put for a false and contrarie: an affirmative for a negative, and contrarily. So sometimes take the wordes of S. Iohn: *do not say concerning it that you shall not pray, for no deniall, when as it doth denie to pray for that signe.*

To the Sortes are referred  $\begin{cases} \text{Simple.} \\ \text{Compound.} \end{cases}$

The first when the generall is taken for the speciall, and contrarily. So the papists by this fallacion do answer to that generall saying of Paul: *We are justified by faith, without the workes of the law.* VVhich they vnderstand of workes done before faith, when that was neuer called in doubt.

The

## OF RHETORIKE

The fallacious which are referred to a compound axiome, are those which are referred eyther to a {  
 Disioyned.  
 Knitting.  
 Axiome.

To a disioyned axiome is when the parts in deed are not disioyned. As, *Salomon was either a King, or did beare rule.*

To a knitting axiom is when the partes are not necessarily knit together. As,

*If Rome be on fire, the Popes chaire is burnt.*

And hitherto of the first sort of fallacious referred to iudgment.

Now followeth the second.

And they be either those that {  
 are referred } To a sillogisme.  
 are referred } To Methode.

And they againe are {  
 Generall.  
 Speciall.

Generall which are referred to the generall properties of a Sillogisme.

It is eyther when all the {  
 parts are } Denied.

parts are } Particular.

All parts denied: As,

*No Pope is a Dinell:*

*No man is a Dinell, Therefore*

*No man is a Pope.*

And this must be answered, that it is not according to the definition of a negative sillogisme, which must haue alwayes one affirmative.

All particular: As,

*Some vnlawfull thing must be suffered, as namely that which cannot be taken away:*

*The steeves is some vnlawfull thing,*

*Therefore the steeves must be suffered,*

This is answered by the definition of a speciall sillogisme, which is that hath one part generall.

The speciall are those which are {  
 referred to the } Simple.  
 referred to the } Compound.

The first simple {  
 Of the first sort.  
 Of the second.

Of the first sort {  
 More plaine.  
 Lesse plaine.

More plaine is when the assumption is denied, or the question is not particular: As,

*Every Apostle may preach abroad:*

*Some Apostle is not a Pope, Therefore*

*Some Pope may not preach abroad,*

Also:

*Every Pope is a Lord:*

*Some Pope may give an vniversal licence,*

*Therefore every Lord may give an vniversal licence.*

Lesse plaine hath one fallacious in common, when the proposition is special: As,

*Some player is a roge:*

*Every vagabond is a roge,*

*Therefore every player is a vagabond.*

# THE ARTE

Also,

Some player is a Reger;

Every vagabond is a Player;

Therefore every player is a Reger.

The fallacy of the first kind is when all the partes be affirmative: As

All Pauls Bishops were ordained for unity;

All Archbishops be ordained for unity;

Therefore all Archbishops are Pauls Bishops.

The fallacy of the second kind is when the assumption is denied: As,

Every puritano is a Christian;

No L. Bishop is a puritano,

Therefore, No L. Bishop is a Christian.

Hitherto of the fallacies referred to a simple Sillogisme.

Now followe those which are referred to a compounde, which are those which are referred either

To the connexive;

To the disioyned.

Of the first sort one is when the first part or antecedent is denied, that the second or consequent may be so likewise: As,

If any man have two benefices, he may escape unpunished at the Bishops hands.

But he may not have two benefices; Therefore

He may not escape unpunished at the Bishops hands.

The second is when the second part is affirmed, that the first may be so also: As,

If every ignorant minister were put out of the Church; and a Preacher in his place;

we should have good order;

But we have good order. Therefore

Every ignorant minister is put out of the Church, and a Preacher in his place.

Of those referred to the disioyned, the first is when all the parts of the disjunction or proposition are not affirmed: As,

Every ignorant minister is to be allowed or not;

But he is not;

Therefore he is.

The second kind is when the second part of the copulative negative axiome is denied, that the first may be so, As,

A non resident is either a faithful or unfaithful minister;

But he is unfaithful; Ergo, &c.

And thus much of the fallacies in a Sillogisme.

The fallacy in Methode is when to deccie w<sup>th</sup> hall, the end is set in the beginning, the speciall before the generall, good order begun; confounded; And finally, what darknes, length and hardnes is laboured after,

FINIS.

